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THOUGHTS FROM CANADA • A COURT REVIEW COLUMN

On Recusal Standards:
The Yukon Francophone School Board Case
Wayne K. Gorman

O

ver the last number of years, a significant number of
Canadian judges have joined the American Judges
Association (Judge Russell Otter of the Ontario Court
of Justice is the current AJA vice president). This has resulted
in these Canadian judges receiving copies of Court Review.
This has provided Canadian judges with an excellent source of
information concerning the law as it exists and unfolds in the
United States of America. Though there are substantial differences between the constitutions and legal systems of our two
countries, there are also great similarities. Thus, Court Review
provides Canadian judges with information that is useful and
relevant to their consideration and application of Canadian law
in the daily fulfillment of their judicial duties.
But no similar Canadian publication provides information
on Canadian law to American judges, though such information
might be of interest or use to American judges.
The purpose of this column in Court Review is to provide
such information concerning the Canadian legal system to
American judges. Thus, the editors willing and the readers being
interested, for each issue of Court Review I will write a brief column on a development in Canadian law that, because of its universal nature, might be of interest to an American judge.
The Canadian cases I refer to may be at any level of court,
but because this edition of Court Review includes the first of
two articles reviewing the past Term of the Unites States
Supreme Court, I have chosen to review a recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Canada that I believe might be of interest and of use to American judges.
YUKON FRANCOPHONE SCHOOL BOARD V. YUKON
(ATTORNEY GENERAL)

siders the issue from the perspective of intervention in the trial
process by the trial judge and in relation to the trial judge’s
involvement with an association with similar goals as one of
the litigants.3
The Background:
In Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon (Attorney General), the Yukon Francophone School Board sued the Yukon
government “for what it claimed were deficiencies in the provision of minority language education. The trial judge ruled in the
Board’s favour on most issues.” On appeal to the Yukon Court of
Appeal, a new hearing was ordered. The Court of Appeal concluded that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias on the
part of the trial judge based upon a number of incidents during
the trial as well as the trial judge’s involvement as a governor of
a philanthropic Francophone community organization in
Alberta. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court agreed, in part, with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the trial judge’s actions during the
hearing raised a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The Trial Judge’s Behavior During the Trial:
During the course of the trial, the trial judge acted in an
unfortunate manner. The Supreme Court of Canada referred
to the trial judge’s behavior as being “troubling and problematic” (at paragraph 44). This included not providing counsel
for the Attorney General an opportunity to be heard; suggesting, without evidence, that counsel’s request for an adjournment was a delay tactic; and treating counsel with a general
lack of respect (such as making disparaging remarks).

The test for recusal based upon an allegation of reasonable
apprehension of bias is essentially the same in Canada, England, and the United States: it is an objective test, which asks
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the presiding judge was unable to carry out his or her function impartially.1 In Yukon Francophone School Board v. Yukon (Attorney
General),2 the Supreme Court of Canada had a recent opportunity to consider when a judge should recuse himself or herself.
One of the interesting things about this decision is that it con-

The Test:
The Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the test for
determining whether a reasonable apprehension of bias has
arisen is an objective one: “what would a reasonable, informed
person think.” The Court noted, at paragraph 22, that the
“objective of the test is to ensure not only the reality, but the
appearance of a fair adjudicative process. The issue of bias is
thus inextricably linked to the need for impartiality.” However,
the Supreme Court also indicated that this does not mean that

Footnotes
1. See Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, [2003] S.C.R. 259 (Can.);
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 566 U.S. 868 (2009); and
Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 451
(A.C. 1999) (U.K.). For cases in the United Kingdom involving an
actual conflict of interest, courts have referred to these as “automatic disqualification cases.” See Locabail (U.K.) Ltd., [2000]
Q.B. 451, 463-64 (U.K.).
2. 2015 S.C.C. 25 (Can.).

3. Matthew Groves suggests that the “facts raised in support of a
claim of bias will always depend upon the wider context of the
case in which they are raised but [in] most cases may be located
within what Deane J described in Webb v The Queen as the ‘four
distinct, though sometimes overlapping main categories’ of bias.
Those categories are interest, conduct, association and extraneous
information.” Matthew Groves, Empathy, Experience & the Rule
Against Bias in Criminal Trials, 36 CRIM. L. J. (Aus.) 84 (2012).
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a judge can have “no prior conceptions [or] opinions” (at paragraphs 33 and 34):
Judicial impartiality and neutrality do not mean that a
judge must have no prior conceptions, opinions or sensibilities. Rather, they require that the judge’s identity and
experiences not close his or her mind to the evidence and
issues. There is, in other words, a crucial difference
between an open mind and empty one.
A judge’s identity and experiences are an important
part of who he or she is, and neither neutrality nor impartiality is inherently compromised by them. Justice is the
aspirational application of law to life. Judges should be
encouraged to experience, learn and understand “life” —
their own and those whose lives reflect different realities.
The Trial Judge’s Interventions:
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of
Appeal that the trial judge’s conduct during the application
raised a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court
concluded that though appellate courts “are rightfully reluctant to intervene on the grounds that a trial judge’s conduct
crossed the line from permissibly managing the trial to
improperly interfering with the case” (at paragraph 54), the
“fine balance” was “inappropriately tipped in this case” (at
paragraph 55):
While the threshold for a reasonable apprehension of
bias is high, in my respectful view, the “fine balance” was
inappropriately tipped in this case. The trial judge’s
actions in relation to the confidentiality of student files,
the request to have Mr. DeBruyn testify by affidavit, the
disparaging remarks, and the unusual costs award and
procedure, taken together and viewed in their context,
would lead a reasonable and informed person to see the
trial judge’s conduct as giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

difficult to see how, based on the evidence, one could
conclude that its vision “would clearly align” with certain
positions taken by the Board in this case or that the trial
judge’s involvement in the organization foreclosed his
ability to approach this case with an open mind. Standing
alone, vague statements about the organization’s mission
and vision do not displace the presumption of impartiality. While I agree that consideration of the trial judge’s
current role as a governor of the organization was a valid
part of the contextual bias inquiry in this case, I am not
persuaded that his involvement with an organization
whose functions are largely undefined on the evidence,
can be said to rise to the level of a contributing factor
such that the judge, as the Court of Appeal said, “should
not have sat on [this case]” (at para. 200).
CONCLUSION

Normally we can avoid applications for recusal, suggesting
that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists, before they are
raised by declining to hear a particular case. However, once
the case commences, excessive intervention will invariably
lead to such an argument being raised. We do not have adopt
a “sphinx-like” demeanor,4 but the Alberta Court of Appeal has
suggested that there will be few “occasions during a trial where
the accused is represented by counsel that a judge may question a witness without creating the impression that he or she is
entering the fray and leaving judicial impartiality behind.”5
Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal has indicated that trial
judges “are, at bottom, listeners” and thus, it “is counsel’s job,
not the trial judge’s, to explore inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony.”6 Thus, although excessive intervention is one potential basis for someone to claim a reasonable apprehension of
judicial bias, it is a basis that we can easily avoid.

The Trial Judge’s Involvement
with a Francophone Association:
The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the Court of
Appeal’s conclusion that the trial judge’s involvement in a
Francophone organization raised a reasonable apprehension of
bias. The Supreme Court held that the mere involvement of
the trial judge in an organization similar to one of the litigants
was insufficient to establish a reasonable apprehension of bias
(at paragraph 62):
In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial
judge’s involvement as a governor of the Fondation
franco-albertaine was problematic. There is, however, little in the record about the organization. In particular, it is
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4. See R. v. McGrath, [2014] 2014 NLCA 40, 2014 CarswellNfld 317,
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 252, ¶ 27 (Can. Nfld.).
5. R. v. Crawford, [2015] 2015 ABCA 175, 2015 CarswellAlta 879, ¶
7 (Can. Alta.).
6. R. v. Huang, [2013] 2013 ONCA 240, 2013 CarswellOnt 4225, 115
O.R. (3d) 596, ¶ 33 (Can. Ont.). A distinction, however, has been
made between comments or questions to a witness and “statements made by a judge during a colloquy,” see R. v. Elliott, [2015]

2015 BCCA 295, 2015 CarswellBC 1957, ¶ 21 (Can. BC.). The following comment by the trial judge to the accused during the
accused’s testimony in Huang led to the Court of Appeal concluding that a reasonable apprehension of bias had been established:
“I’m going to have you stop right there for a minute. Do you understand what perjury is, Sir? Do you want to take a minute with your
counsel and she will instruct you what perjury is and that usually
it incorporates about a year in custody.” 2013 ONCA 240, ¶ 10.
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